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ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS

ACTIONS IN OHIO COURTS*
Michael E. Solimine**
INTRODUCTION

It is a well-settled canon of jurisdictional doctrine that state tribunals are courts of "general" jurisdiction, while federal courts are limited, under article III of the United States Constitution, to hearing
those categories of cases defined by Congress. 1 Meshing with the
broader jurisdiction of state courts is the notion of "concurrent jurisdiction" of causes of action brought under federal statutes. That is, state

courts are generally presumed to have jurisdiction to hear federal
causes of action.' This canon of jurisdiction is also well-settled, and
under it Ohio courts have adjudicated cases brought under federal statutes such as the Labor-Management Relations Act,3 the Truth-in* Copyright 1983 by Michael E. Solimine.
** Member, Ohio Bar. B.A., Wright State University (1978); J.D., Northwestern University
(1981).
1.. See Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 400-02 (1973); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dcv. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262 n.8 (1977); see also P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D.
SHAPIRO

& H.

WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL

SYSTEM 359-60 (2d ed. 1973 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as HART & WECHSLER); C.
WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 22-26 (4th ed. 1983); Bator, The State Courts and Federal

Constitutional Litigation, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 605, 628 (1981).
2. Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 (1982); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473, 477-78 (1981). See generally Redish & Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of
Action in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1976); Comment, State Court Jurisdictionover
Claims Arising under Federal Law, 7 U. DAYTON L. REV. 403 (1982). The doctrine of concurrent
jurisdiction is discussed infra text accompanying notes 28-32.
This article will use the phrase "cause of action" to denote claims arising under federal statutes. The terms "cause of action" and "claims" are not susceptible of precise definition. Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237-39 (1979). However, the title of the Comment, supra, is a bit misleading. Assuming federal "law" includes interpretations of the United States Constitution, claims
arising under such law are adjudicated every day in state courts, particularly in criminal proceedings. See Michigan v. Long, 103 S. Ct. 3469, 3477 n.8 (1983); see also Aldisert, State Courts and
Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 821, 824-25 (1981); Bator, supra
note 1, at 611, 625. State courts are of course presumed competent to hear and decide federal
issues and claims in the context of a lawsuit otherwise brought under state law. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 103 S. Ct. 1303, 1315 n.16 (1983). I recently conducted an
empirical examination of how such claims are treated in published state court decisions. Solimine
& Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. (1983). In contrast, the present article addresses
not mere federal issues or "claims" which are part of a state court proceeding, but causes of
action predicated on liability created by a federal statute.
3. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29
U.S.C.). See, e.g., Neal v. Reliance Elec. & Eng'g Co., 12 Ohio App. 2d 183, 231 N.E.2d 882
(1967).
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Lending Act,4 and the Wage and Hour Act.'
Recently, however, several Ohio courts have rendered disturbing
rulings which deny litigants the opportunity to pursue federal causes of
action in state court. The most prominent of these decisions is Fox v.
Eaton Corp.6 In Fox, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 could not be brought

in Ohio courts. Several lower Ohio courts 8 have since seized upon the
Fox decision to hold that actions brought under federal civil rights statutes, principally section 1983,9 cannot be pursued in state court. These
cases portend a retraction of the previously settled option of Ohio litigants to pursue federal causes of action in either federal or state courts.
These cases are particularly disturbing since they curtail jurisdiction
over the most widely utilized federal civil rights statutes.
This article eiamines the grounds on which these Ohio decisions
retracted jurisdiction. Part I summarizes the purported reasoning of

4. Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
tits. 15 & 18 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Sealey v. Boulevard Constr. Co., 70 Ohio App. 2d 277, 437
N.E.2d 305 (1980); see also Domestic Credit Corp. v. Vazquez, 69 Ohio St. 2d 527, 433 N.E.2d
190 (1981); Stone v. Davis, 66 Ohio St. 2d 74, 419 N.E.2d 190, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1081
(1981).
5. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.). See, e.g., Tag v. Linder, 87 Ohio App. 302, 94 N.E.2d 383 (1949). Another example
would be an action under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976). See,
e.g., Reed v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 171 Ohio St. 433, 171 N.E.2d 718 (1961).
6. 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976). The Ohio Supreme Court's decision led to
an unfortunate result for Ms. Fox. Her later Title VII suit in federal court was dismissed for
untimely filing, despite the fact that the untimeliness was due to her futile effort to sue in state
court. See Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d 716 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981),
on later appeal, 689 F.2d 91 (6th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
7. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
8. These cases are discussed in Part I.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). Section 1983 states as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the
District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
Excellent overviews of recent procedural and substantive developments in § 1983 litigation in
federal courts are found in Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical
Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482 (1982); Manley, The Next Thirty Years of Civil Rights Litigation, 13 URn. LAW. 541 (1981); Comment, Developments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1133 (1977). See also Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
The term "civil rights actions" is used in this article generically, and is meant to cover §
1983, Title VII, and other statutes found in title 42 of the United States Code.
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these cases. Part II develops three rationales for calling into question
the validity of these decisions: namely, they conflict with the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, violate the rule prohibiting discrimination between federal and state causes of action, and, ultimately, are
incompatible with the obligations of state courts to hear federal actions. Once jurisdiction of such actions is accepted in a state court,
however, certain problems regarding the choice of federal or state substantive and procedural law can arise. These problems are briefly addressed in Part III. Finally, having established (1) that Ohio courts can
and should entertain federal causes of action, and (2) that any choice
of law questions can be easily resolved, I conclude that Fox and its
progeny were incorrectly decided. Both legal theory and public policy
support the availability of Ohio courts to entertain federal civil rights
actions.
I.

ABDICATING RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENFORCING FEDERAL CIVIL

RIGHTS ACTIONS: SOME RECENT CASES
Title VII and section 1983 are the two most utilized federal civil
rights statutes. In the early 1980's, they accounted for almost one-third
of the filings in civil cases in federal district courts. 10 Given the
overburdened caseloads of the federal courts," it is not surprising that
some litigants have attempted to pursue remedies under these statutes
in an alternate forum-that is, the state courts.
Title VII prohibits certain discriminatory employment practices
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 2 The statute sets
out a complex scheme of overlapping federal and state enforcement
procedures which a litigant must follow's before suit is permitted in a
federal district court.1 4 State court jurisdiction is not mentioned in the

10.

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 98-

108. The data is further collected and discussed in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 950;
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 523-36; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.13 (1981) (Powell, J.,
concurring). The large number of such cases gives some indication of their importance to plaintiffs. Whether such figures suggest that civil rights actions overburden federal courts is another
question. See infra notes 106-07.
11.
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE U.S. COURTS, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 99,
103, 111 (this report documents the rise in filings over time). Disproportionately rising caseloads
have been evident in the Northern and Southern Districts of Ohio. Id. at 215.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(b) (1976).
13. In Ohio, Title VII plaintiffs must first bring charges of discrimination before the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), a federal agency, and the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission (OCRC). If proceedings before these agencies do not yield satisfactory relief, plaintiffs may then bring suit in state or federal court. For further discussion of this procedure, see
infra text accompanying notes 37-51.
14. "Each United States district court ... shall have jurisdiction of actions brought under
this [title]." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (1976). Under the legislation establishing the OCRC, both
the OCRC, and, in some cases, private individuals, may bring enforcement proceedings in state
Published
by eCommons, 1983
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statute.
In Fox v. Eaton Corp.,'5 the plaintiff brought a Title VII suit in

an Ohio trial court. The trial court found for the plaintiff on the merits,
a judgment subsequently affirmed by the court of appeals. On further
appeal, the Ohio Supreme Court held, in a brief opinion, that Title VII
vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. Having raised the
issue on its own as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the court
directed that the suit be dismissed. 16
Section 1983 permits suits to remedy "the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws"
of the United States.'" Unlike Title VII, section 1983 covers a broader
range of unlawful conduct (though it is limited to acts of government
officials), and presents a streamlined procedural scheme. Jurisdiction

itself is not mentioned in section 1983; federal courts hear section 1983
actions under the aegis of the general jurisdictional provisions permitting suit for deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or the
laws of the United States.18
In the wake of Fox, several Ohio courts of appeals declined to
hear causes of action brought under the federal civil rights laws. Plaintiffs in Wheeler v. General Motors Corp.' 9 brought suit under Ohio tort
law and section 1985(3),20 a companion provision to section 1983. The
court. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01 to .99 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982).
15. 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976).
16. Id. at 238, 358 N.E.2d at 537.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. V 1981). See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979).

19. No. 79-5889 (Ct. App. Montgomery Co., Ohio Jan. 12, 1979).
20. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. V 1981). Section 1985(3) states as follows:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway
or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted
authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such
State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to
prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from
giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any
lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of
Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of
such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more
persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of
such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having
and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured
or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
'deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.
id. Congress enacted this conspiracy provision at approximately the same time it passed § 1983.
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971); United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners, Local 610
v. Scott, 103 S. Ct. 3352 (1983). The jurisdictional counterpart of § 1985(3) is 28 U.S.C. § 1343
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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trial court dismissed the federal claim on the merits. That decision was
affirmed on appeal, but the court of appeals added, purporting to follow
the lead of Fox, that state courts had no jurisdiction over section 1985
actions. 1 While acknowledging that the Ohio Constitution 22 and Revised Code 8 grant trial courts "original jurisdiction" in all civil cases,
the Wheeler court nevertheless held that
[w]hether such subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases include [sic]
subject-matter jurisdiction in actions created by Congress and imposed
upon federal district courts raises a question of federal power to add to
the assignment of jurisdiction to state courts. Every logical reason and
impediment against such exercise by Congress of state's [sic] rights must
be explored and exhausted before accepting imposition of jurisdictional
changes in state courts.'
The court of appeals therefore concluded that no jurisdiction could be
exercised over section 1985 actions.' 5 Several other courts of appeals,
citing Wheeler, have refused to exercise jurisdiction over section 1983
actions as well.2
The Fox and Wheeler decisions and their progeny deserve critical
examination. In Fox, the Ohio Supreme Court did not establish a per
se rule against adjudicating federal causes of action. Indeed, by invok(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
21. Wheeler, slip op. at 6-7.
22. OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 4(B).
23. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.01 (Page 1981). Both the Ohio Constitution and the
Ohio Revised Code refer to.vesting jurisdiction in the "courts of common pleas." For convenience,
however, this article will refer to such tribunals as simply the trial courts of Ohio.
24. Wheeler, slip op. at 6-7. The Wheeler court went on to hold that the trial court was
correct in dismissing the § 1985(3) claim on the merits. Id. at 8-11. The court was compelled to
reach the merits since an assignment of error was made on that point. Id. at 7. See OmO R. APp.
P. 12(A).

25. Wheeler, slip op. at 7.
26. Ehler v. Montgomery County Joint Vocational School, No. 82-7509 (Ct. App. Montgomery Co., Ohio Aug. 9, 1982); Johnson v. City of Dayton, No. 81-7184 (Ct. App. Montgomery
Co., Ohio Oct. 7, 1981); Shapiro v. City of Dayton, No. 81-7183 (Ct. App. Montgomery Co.,
Ohio Oct. 6, 1981).
These cases, of course, represent a narrow sample of Ohio case law. Surprisingly, none are
published, although Ohio is notorious for the erratic manner in which decisions of lower Ohio
courts are printed in the official reporters. See Black, Hide and Seek Precedent: Phantom Opinions in Ohio, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 477 (1981); Richert, Update on Ohio Judicial Reporting, 41
OHIO ST. L.J. 675 (1980). The Ohio Supreme Court decides, by law, which lower court opinions

will be published. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2505.20 (Page 1981). However, recent rules promulgated by the court may forecast a more consistent treatment in this area. 3 Ohio St. 3d xxi, 444
N.E.2d (Ohio cases) LXIX (1983).
Unfortunately, LEXIS does not catalog unreported Ohio cases. Black, supra, at 481 n.20.
Only reported Ohio decisions, aside from those unreported decisions discussed in this article, can
be analyzed. Thus, this article is only a partial response to Professor Eisenberg's suggestion that a
study be made of § 1983 actions in state courts. Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 524 n.179. This writer
doubts, however,
that many1983
§ 1983 cases would surface in such a study.
Published
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ing the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction, the court apparently assumed
that concurrent jurisdiction could lie in Ohio courts only under what it
viewed as a properly drafted statute. For reasons to be developed
shortly, the Fox court distorted the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction
and misconstrued the language and legislative history of Title VII.
Moreover, the Wheeler result does not inexorably flow from the
Fox decision. As outlined above, sections 1983 and 1985 have no jurisdictional statements which might be construed to interdict the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. Yet the court in Wheeler framed
the issue as whether Congress could "impose" jurisdictional "changes"
upon state trial courts. Answering the question in the negative, the
Wheeler court cited no authority aside from Fox.'7 This holding is dubious. It ignores both conventional jurisdictional doctrines and authority from other Ohio tribunals and the courts of sister states. Sound
legal and public policy rationales compel the rejection of the Fox and
Wheeler decisions. These rationales are explored in the following

section.
II.

THE BASIS FOR AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: CONCURRENT
JURISDICTION, ANTIDISCRIMINATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE DUTY

A reading of the Fox and Wheeler opinions alone might suggest
that Ohio courts are writing on a clean slate in determining whether to
hear federal causes of action. In fact, the opposite is true. A well-devel-

oped jurisprudence supports the ability and duty of state courts to hear
most causes of action under federal statutes. The basic presumption is
one of concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, two corollary doctrines hold
that state courts must hear federal causes of action when they hear
analogous state causes of action, and that, in any event, state courts are

under an obligation to adjudicate federal actions. All three of these
doctrines are at variance with the Fox and Wheeler decisions.
A.

The Presumption of Concurrent Jurisdiction

In permitting, but not mandating, the creation of lower federal
courts, the drafters of article III of the United States Constitution contemplated that state courts could entertain federal causes of action.28

27. The Wheeler decision did not cite or discuss the doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction, or
the antidiscrimination/analogous right doctrine derived from Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947),
both of which are addressed in Part II, infra. Ironically, had the Wheeler court discussed these
doctrines, it may have found some support for its holding in the "valid excuse" doctrine emanating from Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). See infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. I
conclude, nevertheless, that no "valid excuse" supports the Wheeler court's rejection of concurrent
jurisdiction. The disturbing point is that the Wheeler court did not even discuss these issues.
28. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 11-12; Redish & Woods, Congressional Power to
Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New Synthesis, 124
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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While states can control the formation and jurisdiction of their own

courts, the supremacy clause2 9 of the Constitution mandates that such

courts recognize federal law as paramount.8 0 Relying on this historical
background, the United States Supreme Court has frequently restated
the general rule that state courts may assume jurisdiction over federal
causes of action, absent either congressional directives to the contrary
or an incompatibility between the federal claim and state court jurisdiction. 1 This presumption of concurrent jurisdiction may only be rebutted by "an explicit [federal] statutory directive, [an unmistakable
implication from legislative history, or

. .

.a clear incompatibility be-

'
tween state-court jurisdiction and federal interests."82
In Fox, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on the jurisdictional provisions for Title VII which only referred to federal district courts. The
court, with no analysis, converted the silence on state court jurisdiction
into a presumption that state courts had no jurisdiction at all to entertain Title VII suits. 83 However, the court erred in assuming that an
explicit congressional directive was necessary to vest state courts with
Title VII jurisdiction. The opposite is true. Given congressional silence
on the matter, the Fox court should have presumed that there was state
court jurisdiction.-4 Numerous other state and federal courts have rejected the Fox holding and concluded that Title VII suits could be litigated in either federal or state forums. 8

U. PA. L. REV. 45, 52-53 (1975); THE FEDERALIST No. 82 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
29. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.
30. See Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 269 (1982); Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 45
(1982); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981).
31. Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 266; Gulf Offshore Co., 453 U.S. at 477-78; Charles Dowd Box
Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 507 (1962); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
32. Hathorn, 457 U.S. at 266 (quoting Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473,
478 (1981)).
Professor Redish has argued that this presumption should be reversed. In the face of congressional silence, he contends that we should initially assume that state courts cannot adjudicate
federal causes of action. Given the present realities of federal court expertise in relation to state
court expertise, as well as the complexity of many federal cases, Redish argues that the current
presumption is unjustified. Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 325-30. I have elsewhere argued
that Redish's own assumptions are overbroad. Solimine & Walker, supra note 2, at (calling
into question Redish's shifting of the burden of proof on the jurisdictional presumption). Ironically, the Fox and Wheeler decisions appear to have adopted the Redish position.
33. 48 Ohio St. 2d at 237, 358 N.E.2d at 537.
34. See, e.g., California v. Arizona, 440 U.S. 59, 66-68 (1979). Another commentator has
concluded, on similar grounds, that Fox was decided incorrectly. See Comment, supra note 2, at
418-19.
35. Only one federal court and one state court have reached the same conclusion as Fox.
Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Mich. 1978); Lucas v. Tanner Bros. Contracting Co., 10 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1104 (Ariz. Super. Ct. 1974). At least several
federal courts and two state courts have held that state courts can hear Title VII cases. Salem v.
LaSalle by
High
School, 31 1983
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 10 (C.D. Cal. 1983); Green v. County
Published
eCommons,
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A consideration of the factors which might rebut the presumption
of concurrent jurisdiction does not compel a different result. The legislation establishing Title VII does not contain an "explicit statutory directive" forbidding state court jurisdiction. It is settled that the mere
failure to mention state courts does not preclude their taking jurisdiction.36 Moreover, neither the legislative history nor the statutory
scheme of Title VII suggests that state courts should be divested of
jurisdiction.
A Title VII plaintiff must proceed before both a federal agency,
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and state
administrative and adjudicatory bodies. In a "deferral" state such as
Ohio, 7 a complainant must first file a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC and the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC).3 The OCRC
can undertake investigatory review and hold evidentiary hearings, similar to the work done by the EEOC.8 9 Review of the OCRC's findings
may then be sought in Ohio courts.' 0 The EEOC may not act for sixty
days, or until state proceedings have terminated.'. If unsatisfied with
the outcome before the state bodies, the Title VII complainant may
press his charge before the EEOC. If the EEOC declines to initiate a
suit on the charging party's behalf, a civil action may be brought by
the plaintiff in federal court.' 3
The legislative history of Title VII emphasizes the importance of
state antidiscrimination laws in the statute's enforcement scheme.'3

School Bd., 524 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Va. 1981); Peterson v. Eastern Airlines, 20 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 1322 (W.D. Tex. 1979); Bennum v. Board of Governors, 413 F. Supp. 1274 (D. N.J.
1976); Peper v. Princeton Univ., 77 N.J. 55, 389 A.2d 465 (1978); Vason v. Carrano, 31 Conn.
Supp. 338, 330 A.2d 98 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1974). See generally Fox v. Eaton Corp., 615 F.2d
716, 719 n.7, 719-20 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 935 (1981), on later appeal, 689 F.2d
91 (6th Cir. 1982).
36. See supra text accompanying notes 28-32.
37. Section 706(c) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act provides that a complainant must first
initiate proceedings with the state agency (if any) which has authority to grant relief from unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976). The EEOC has recognized the OCRC
as a "deferral" agency, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1982), so-called since the EEOC must "defer" to
the state agency before initiating its own proceedings. Id. See also infra note 38.
38. If a charge of discrimination is filed with the EEOC, the federal agency must "defer" to
state agency action for at least sixty days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1976). Typically, the EEOC
and state agencies have "work-sharing" agreements, where the EEOC refers paperwork to the
state agency. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.13 (1982); Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972). The EEOC
and the OCRC have such an agreement (on file with University of Dayton Law Review).
39. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.05 (Page 1980).
40. Id. § 4112.06.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c)-(d) (1976).
42. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(1), (3). See supra note 14.
43. The legislative history of the drafting of Title VII procedures was extensively reviewed
in Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982), and in Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, The Proper Role of Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Title VII Suits, 79 MIcH. L.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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The United States Supreme court recently took pains to reiterate the
states' role in Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp." In Kremer, the
Court held that the federal courts, in Title VII suits, must give res
judicata or collateral estoppel effect to a state court decision upholding
a deferral state agency's rejection of an employment discrimination
claim. This result is supported, the Court emphasized, by the intent of
the drafters of Title VII who desired to accommodate state antidiscrimination programs45 and did not "envision full litigation of a single
claim in both state and federal forums."4 6 Preclusion is thus proper, the
Court concluded, when a party has had a "full and fair opportunity" to
litigate the employment discrimination claim in state courts.",
Some courts and commentators have concluded differently, arguing that state court adjudication of Title VII cases would be anomalous
because the Title VII legislative scheme vests "final enforcement" of
Title VII actions in federal courts. 8 To be sure, the Title VII scheme
vests primary responsibility for litigation in federal courts. However, it
does not vest exclusive responsibility in the federal forum. The Kremer
Court acknowledged the "final responsibility" of the federal courts to
enforce Title VII.49 This rule was originally meant to emphasize, the
Court explained, that the EEOC must turn to federal courts to adjudicate claims or impose sanctions against employers.5 0 Permitting a complainant to sue in either federal or state court, after the EEOC declines
to further litigate, does not disrupt the Title VII enforcement scheme.

REV. 1485 (1981).

44. 456 U.S. 461 (1982). The Court held that Title VII was not an exception to the preclusive effect to be given state court judgments in federal court, as mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1976). 456 U.S. at 476.
45. 456 U.S. at 472-74. See also Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 43, at 14921510; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 2890 (1983).
46. 456 U.S. at 474 (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 480. The Court went on to state that, to be given preclusive effect, the state
procedures must satisfy the due process clause. Id. The Court concluded that the "panoply of
[New York procedures in question], complemented by administrative as well as judicial review,"
was sufficient under the due process clause. Id. at 481.
48. Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. 43, 45-48 (E.D. Mich. 1978) (construing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974)). See also Jackson, Matheson & Piskorski,
supra note 43, at 1514 n.164. The latter authors argue that permitting concurrent jurisdiction will
prevent federal courts, under traditional issue or claim preclusion principles, from passing on the
fairness and adequacy of state substantive antidiscrimination law, since a Title VII suit could
have been brought in the state court system. Id. This assumption appears to be true, but it by no
means proves fatal to the ability of Title VII claimants, in Ohio or other deferral states, to bring
suit in federal court. Only those plaintiffs who seek state court review of OCRC findings, or actually bring a Title VII suit in state court, will suffer preclusion of any sort in federal court. If a
Title VII plaintiff elects only to seek remedies before the state agency, as opposed to the state
courts, no preclusion principles are applicable. Kremer, 456 U.S. at 470 n.7.
49.

Kremer, 456 U.S. at 447.

50. byId.
at 477-78 (distinguishing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. at 36 (1974)).
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Under the supremacy clause, the state court would in any event be
bound to apply principles of federal law for the purposes of determining
liability and enforcing remedies developed under Title VII. 51 Likewise,
state courts should insist, as federal courts must, that a Title VII plaintiff follow the procedural prerequisites in the Title VII scheme before
instituting suit.62
The problems that some have anticipated with state court adjudication of Title VII actions should be eased by these procedures. Absent
"clear incompatibility" between the federal statutory scheme and state
court jurisdiction, there seems to be little to be gained by denying state
adjudication of Title VII actions. In short, the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction should hold in Title VII actions.
A similar analysis is applicable to section 1983 actions. As previously suggested, section 1983 is in one sense narrower than Title VII,
since it only reaches unlawful acts performed under color of state law.53
However, it is far broader in the types of conduct which it makes actionable, namely, any conduct violative of the rights secured by the
Constitution and laws of the United States." Unlike Title VII, section
1983 is not burdened by an onerous jurisdictional scheme. Indeed, in
Patsy v. Board of Regents,55 the Supreme Court recently reiterated the

51. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30. One court has argued that concurrent jurisdiction was inconsistent with the reference in Title VII to certain procedures being governed by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dickinson v. Chrysler Corp., 456 F. Supp. at 47 n.7. However, such procedures might be available under parallel provisions of state rules of civil procedure.
Any federal procedures which are not available under, or inconsistent with, state law can be borrowed for state court actions. See generally infra Part III.
52. The New Jersey Supreme Court followed this procedure in Peper v. Princeton Univ., 77
N.J. 55, 75-76, 389 A.2d 465, 475 (1978). Arguably, these procedural prerequisites, so integral to
the Title VII enforcement process, must be followed by litigants in state court. See generally infra
Part Ill.
53. Section 1983 reaches actions performed "under color of state law." The fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits certain action by the "state." If a public
official or agency is sued in a § 1983 action for violations of the fourteenth amendment, the
inquiries as to the § 1983 and fourteenth amendment violations are identical and collapse into one.
See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2754 (1982). The inquiries may be more
intricate if a private actor, who allegedly acted "under color of state law," is sued. Id. at 2749-53,
2756. "State action" is not required to be shown under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1985 (1976 & Supp. V
1981).
54. See generally I C. ANTIEAU, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHrs AcTs chs. 4-9 (2d ed. 1980) (discussing conduct actionable under § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (expansive
construction of the word "law" in § 1983); Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 504-15. But see Pennhurst
State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981) (both cases restricting construction of "law" in
§ 1983). See also Manley, supra note 9; Sunstein, Section 1983 and the PrivateEnforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U. CI. L. REV. 394 (1982).
55. 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Interestingly, one state court, which found concurrent jurisdiction
for § 1983 actions, also applied the "no exhaustion" rule reaffirmed in Patsy. See Silverman v.
University of Colorado, 36 Colo. App. 269, 279, 541 P.2d 93, 98-100 (1975). This holding appears
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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generally accepted rule that state administrative remedies need not be
exhausted as a prerequisite to bringing a section 1983 action in federal
court.
Given the streamlined nature of section 1983 jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Martinez v. California,6 had little difficulty in deciding that the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction was satisfied:
We note that the California courts accepted jurisdiction of this federal claim. That exercise of jurisdiction appears to be consistent with the
general rule that where
"'an act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved, without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is no reason why it should not
be enforced, if not provided otherwise by some act of Congress, by a
proper action in a State court.'" Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391, quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137.
See also Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 36, n. 17 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting); Grubb v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 281 U.S. 470, 476. We have
never considered, however, the question whether a State must entertain a
claim under § 1983. We note that where the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be enforced in the state courts, the state
courts are generally not free to refuse enforcement of the federal claim.
Testa v. Katt, supra, at 394. But see Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn.
25, 442 S.W. 2d 248 (1969).51
A large number of state courts have assumed concurrent jurisdiction
over section 1983 actions. 58 A recent Ohio appellate decision, Jackson

to be consistent with the legislative history of § 1983. See infra text accompanying notes 62-65.
See generally Note, Exhaustion of State Administrative Remedies in Section 1983 Actions, 50
U. CIN. L. REV. 594 (1981).
56. 444 U.S. 277, 283-84 n.7 (1980). For other cases and authorities which stand for the
proposition that in an action brought pursuant to § 1983, state courts and federal courts have
concurrent jurisdiction, see Smith v. Wade, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1640 n.23 (1983); Maine v.
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3 n.1, 11 (1980); Neuborne, Toward ProceduralParity in Constitutional
Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 748-52 (1981); Note, Limiting the Section 1983 Action
in the Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1497-98 n.62 (1969).
57. Martinez, 444 U.S. at 283 n.7.
58. Courts in at least seventeen states have held that they have concurrent jurisdiction over
§ 1983 claims. E.g., Santana v. Registrars of Voters, 81 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2061, 425 N.E.2d 745
(1981); Royer v. Adams, 121 N.H. 1024, 437 A.2d 316 (1981) (per curiam); Bleecker v. Montgomery County, 48 Md. App. 455, 427 A.2d 1075 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.), rev'd on other grounds,
292 Md. 121, 433 A.2d 1348 (1981); Durango School Dist. v. Thorpe, 200 Colo. 268, 614 P.2d
880 (1980); Colvin v. Bowen, Ind. App. , 399 N.E.2d 835 (1980); Ingram v. Moody,
382 So. 2d 522 (Ala. 1980); Thiboutot v. Maine, 405 A.2d 230 (Me. 1979), aif'd, 448 U.S. 1
(1980); Ramirez v. County of Hudson, 169 N.J. Super. 455, 404 A.2d 1271 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1979); Young v. Toia, 66 A.D.2d 377, 413 N.Y.S.2d 530 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 24 Wash. App. 416, 601 P.2d 963 (1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 831
(1980); Tobeluk v. Lind, 589 P.2d 873 (Alaska 1979); Board of Trustees v. Holso, 584 P.2d 1009
(Wyo. 1978); Bohacs v. Reid, 63 Il1. App. 3d 477. 379 N.E.2d 1372 (1978); Terry v. Kolski, 78
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v. Kurtz,59 followed the lead of these cases and explicitly held that it
had jurisdiction over section 1983 cases. Moreover, numerous other reported Ohio decisions have assumed jurisdiction under section 1983
and reached the merits of cases.60 Against this background, the recent
Ohio decisions disclaiming jurisdiction over these actions seem to have
little precedential value.
One state court, however, has held that the legislative history of
section 1983 effectively rebuts the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction. 61 Section 1983 and the Reconstruction constitutional amendments62 were the products of the enhancement of the power of the federal government after the Civil War. The drafters of section 1983 were
Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977); Saunders v. Creamer, 464 Pa. 2, 345 A.2d 702 (1975);
Brown v. Pitchess, 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); New Times Inc. v.
Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974). Accord Long v. District of Columbia, 469 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Young v. Board of Educ., 416 F. Supp. 1139 (D. Colo. 1976).
See also Aldisert, supra note 2, at 825 n.13; Neuborne, supra note 56, at 752 n.l 14.
59. 65 Ohio App. 2d 152, 416 N.E.2d 1064 (1974). The Jackson court distinguished Fox,
as does this article, by noting that the court in Fox was confronted with a statute which, unlike §
1983, expressly vested exclusive jurisdiction in the federal courts. See id. at 156, 416 N.E.2d at
1067.
60. At least three Ohio Supreme Court decisions and five reported lower court decisions
have assumed jurisdiction over causes of action brought under § 1983, without expressly discussing the jurisdictional issue. See Kilburnv. Guard, 5 Ohio St. 3d 21, 448 N.E.2d 1153 (1983) (per
curiam); Jenkins v. Krieger, 67 Ohio St. 2d 314, 423 N.E.2d 856 (per curiam), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1124 (1981); Wholesale Elec. & Supply, Inc. v. Robusky, 22 Ohio St. 2d 181, 258 N.E.2d
432 (1970); White v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 2 Ohio App. 3d 178, 441 N.E.2d 303 (1982);
Swigert v. Miller, 39 Ohio App. 2d 107, 315 N.E.2d 818 (1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 805
(1976) (mem.); Schneider v. Ohio Youth Comm'n, 31 Ohio App. 2d 225, 287 N.E.2d 633 (1972);
Lakewood Homes, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment, 25 Ohio App. 2d 125, 267 N.E.2d 595 (1971);
Gilmore v. General Motors Corp., 35 Ohio Misc. 36, 300 N.E.2d 259 (C.P. Ct. 1973).
61. Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. 25, 442 S.W.2d 248 (1969). The Georgia Supreme
Court has refused to assert § 1983 jurisdiction over certain classes of cases. See Baranan v. Fulton
County, 250 Ga. 531, 299 S.E.2d 722, cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 2092 (1983) (mem.) (nuisance
action); Backus v. Chilivis, 236 Ga. 500, 224 S.E.2d 370 (1976) (tax assessments). It is unclear if
Georgia would be unwilling to adjudicate any § 1983 action.
62. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (ratified 1865); amend. XIV (ratified 1868); amend. XV (ratified 1870). See generally H. HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW (1983); H.
HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION: THE IMPACT OF THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION ON

(1973).
Of course, the extent to which the intent of the framers of the fourteenth amendment can or
should be relevant to the interpretation of the amendment is the subject of the current debate
between advocates of the various modes of "interpretivist" and "noninterpretivist" judicial review.
See generally Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
745 (1983). On the other hand, there seems to be much less controversey in divining the intent of
the framers to determine if exclusive jurisdiction of a certain statute lies in federal courts. See
Note, Intent, Clear Statements, and the Common Law: Statutory Interpretationin the Supreme
Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 892, 908-12 (1982). Critics of parity, in particular, have been willing to
rely on the intentions of the Reconstruction Congress. See generally Solimine & Walker, supra
THE CONSTITUTION

note 2, at __ . But cf. id. at

-

&

-

n.113 (questioning the relevance of the 19th century

view of state courts to conditions today); Eisenberg, supra note 9 (arguing that current interpretations of § 1983 should not be bound by patterns of tort law when § 1983 was enacted).
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concerned in large part with what they perceived as antipathy or apathy of state authorities toward the protection of federal constitutional
rights." A separate statute to protect these rights was thought neces,sary. It would be inconsistent, the court argued, to permit state courts
to enforce a statute which was enacted because state authorities themselves were reluctant to protect federal rights."'
This argument fails foi two reasons. Section 1983 did owe its existence to congressmen who felt state courts would not or could not protect federal rights. It does not follow, however, that exclusive jurisdiction is thereby vested in federal courts. As the Patsy decision recently
emphasized, section 1983 was viewed by its drafters as providing "dual
or concurrent forums in the state and federal system, enabling the
plaintiff to choose the forum in which to seek relief."6 5 It is difficult to
imagine more explicit legislative history endorsing the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction.
Second, to retreat behind the historical concerns of over one hundred years ago only confirms the worst fears of the Reconstruction legislators. 66 Even in recent years, academic critics have challenged the
competence of state courts to fully and fairly adjudicate federal constitutional rights.6 A refusal to adjudicate section 1983 actions lends sup-

63. See Haring v. Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 2378 (1983); Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506-07; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242-43 (1972). See also Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 484-85; Solimine
& Walker, supra note 2, at _.
64. Chamberlain v. Brown, 223 Tenn. at 35, 442 S.W.2d at 252. See also Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5, 23-24 (1980); Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 498-509,
254 N.W.2d 704, 713-18 (1977) (Hansen, J., dissenting).
65. Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506. The drafters of § 1983 were perhaps influenced by the fact that,
until 1875, most federal questions were litigated in state courts. In that year, the jurisdiction of
federal courts was expanded to include federal question jurisdiction. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch.
137, 18 Stat. 470 (1875) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (Supp. V 1981)). See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 39.
Admittedly, the above-quoted language from Patsy might be read narrowly, to infer that the
drafters of § 1983 meant to grant plaintiffs a choice between a common-law tort action in state
court or a § 1983 action in federal court. Such a reading, of course, would conflict with the
generally accepted doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction. The leading case on that doctrine, Claflin v.
Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876), was decided only five years after the passage of § 1983, and
purported to restate the accepted rule of concurrent jurisdiction. Id. at 136-37. See C. WRIGHT,
supra note 1, at 36, 268.
66. The point is forcefully expressed in Terry v. Kolski, 78 Wis. 2d 475, 489 n.2, 254
N.W.2d 704, 709 n.2 (1977) (disclaiming jurisdiction over § 1983 actions "would ratify adherence
to the very evil the civil rights acts were designed to obviate").
67. E.g., Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1105 (1977); Redish & Woods,
supra note 28, at 100-02. I have elsewhere argued that the available empirical data, in fact,
undercuts the assumptions of Neuborne and Redish. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 2. Cf
Whitman, supra note 64, at 24 n. 114 (arguing that "state court competence and bias may be less
important in most § 1983 damage actions than they are in other contexts") (emphasis added). In
such actions, courts often will not decide whether certain conduct was constitutional or not, but
only decide whether the state acted in good faith in enforcing procedures which are later deter-
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port to the historical and modern critics of state courts. Only by acknowledging the duty to enforce federal rights and federal causes of
action will state courts merit their characterization as tribunals with
responsibility equal to that of federal courts in enforcing and protecting
federal rights.6 Moreover, caseload burdens and immunity barriers
such as the eleventh amendment 9 may prevent litigants, as a practical
or legal matter, from effectively reaching federal courts. State courts
should welcome the opportunity to challenge the critics of "parity" by
providing a forum for such litigants. The incremental cost of adjudicating a small number of additional causes of action surely is outweighed
by the benefits of granting relief to litigants and familiarizing state
judges with the expanding substantive scope of federal law.
B.

The Analogous Right/AntidiscriminationPrinciple

Despite the apparent acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction, a number of state courts in the first half of this century characterized federal
causes of action as "foreign" or "penal" laws and refused to adjudicate
them. The United States Supreme Court soon overturned these refusals, holding that state courts had to adjudicate federal causes of action
without discrimination between "state" and "federal" plaintiffs. While
this antidiscrimination principle has long thwarted most state court attempts to deny jurisdiction over federal causes of action, it is still useful
to examine the principle because it sheds light upon the ultimate jurisdictional obligation imposed upon state courts.
The antidiscrimination principle was first fully articulated in Mondou v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad,70 when the Supreme Court held that Connecticut courts could not refuse to adjudicate a claim under the Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA)7"

mined to be unlawful. Id. Such "good-faith" immunity is addressed in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 102
S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
68. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518
(1982); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Most, but not all, academic observers would disagree with this characterization. Compare
Neuborne, supra note 56, with Bator, supra note 1.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. See generally Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the
Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations,
69 CALIF. L. REV. 189 (1981). In general, the eleventh amendment prohibits federal courts from
awarding retrospective monetary relief against a state for violations of federal law. See Quern v.
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). Thoughtful summaries and criticisms of the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment jurisprudence appear in Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 487-90; Lichtenstein, Retroactive Relief in the FederalCourts since Edelman v. Jordan:A Trip Through the Twilight Zone,
32 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 364 (1982).
70. 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Mondou and related Supreme Court cases are discussed in C.
WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 268-73; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 434-38; Neuborne, supra
note 56, at 753-59.
71. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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when those courts were vested with jurisdiction over analogous state
tort claims. In Floyd v. Dubois Soap Co. 7 2 the Supreme Court summarily reversed a decision by the Ohio Supreme Court which had refused to adjudicate, as a "penal" law, an action under the Fair Labor
Standards Act. 3 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court rendered the
leading decision, Testa v. Katt.7 4 In Testa, the Court rejected an effort

by Rhode Island courts, to deny jurisdiction of claims under the Emergency Price Control Act.7 5 Invoking the principle of concurrent jurisdiction, the Court held that Rhode Island courts could not discriminate
against federal plaintiffs when the courts adjudicated similar, but not
identical, claims under state law. 6 More recently, the Supreme Court
reiterated these principles in Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC) v. Mississippi, 7 where the Court upheld the constitutionality
of certain provisions of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act

(PURPA).

8

In the course of its decision, the FERC Court, reiterating

Testa, upheld a provision of the Act requiring state regulatory agencies
to implement certain rules. 7 ' Testa was controlling, the Court held,'
since the state agency had statutory authority to consider analogous
disputes under state law. 80

Based on this authority, the Supreme Court in Martinez v. California8g held that a state court could not refuse to enforce a section
1983 action when the same type of claim was actionable under state

law. 82 This reasoning alone suggests the unsoundness of Wheeler"8 and

72. 139 Ohio St. 520, 41 N.E.2d 393, rev'd per curiam, 317 U.S. 596 (1942).
73. Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
29 U.S.C.).
74. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
75. Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-421, 56 Stat. 23 (codified in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.) (repealed 1947).
76. 330 U.S. at 394. See Neuborne, supra note 56, at 756-57.
77. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
78. Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
tits. 15, 16, 30, 42 & 43 U.S.C.).
79. FERC, 456 U.S. at 760-61. The provision in question, § 210(0 of title II of the Act, 16
U.S.C. § 824a-3(f) (Supp. V 1981), requires state utility authorities to implement certain rules
promulgated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. See FERC, 456 U.S. at 750-51, 759.
80. 456 U.S. at 760. The partial dissents in FERC were less sanguine about applying Testa
to state agencies, as opposed to state courts. Id. at 773-74 n.4 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 784-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissenters' concerns are echoed
in Guida, Commandeering State Government: Renewed Confusion Over Federal Power under the
Clean Air Act, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 579, 606-07 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Term, 96
HARV. L. REV. 186, 193 (1982). For present purposes, it need only be stated that FERC forcefully reiterated, and arguably went beyond, the antidiscrimination principles found in' Testa.
81. 444 U.S. 277 (1980).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 56-57.
83. byNo.
79-5889 (Ct.1983
App. Montgomery Co., Ohio Jan. 12, 1979).
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and the

state itself may be sued in the Ohio Court of Claims.85 While such
actions in tort are not identical to a typical section 1983 action,86 they
surely are sufficiently similar to trigger the antidiscrimination rule. Applying this doctrine to the Title VII situation is more problematic. A
court enforcement action under the OCRC differs in some respects
from a typical Title VII court action. 7 But the differences are not of a
quantum nature; the very fact that adjudication under the state agency
exists at all suggests the presence of an analogous cause of action. The
existence of such state-level enforcement schemes belies the holdings of

the Wheeler court and its progeny; in refusing to adjudicate Title VII
and section 1983 actions, Ohio courts run afoul of the antidiscrimination principle.
C.

The Obligation to Enforce Federal Causes of Action

The Wheeler court 8 and its progeny did not attempt to distinguish
the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction in general, or the antidiscrimination principle in particular. Instead, the courts avoided these
doctrines and reached the more difficult question of whether Congress
could "impose" an obligation upon state courts to hear federal actions.
Having reached the precipice, the courts backed away, dubiously applying the doctrine of exclusive jurisdiction to federal civil rights
84.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN.

§ 2743.02 (Page 1981). See also 15

OHIo JUR.

3d Civil Ser-

vants and Other Public Officers and Employees §§ 240-46 (1979); Note, Official Immunity in
Ohio: How To Sue the King's Men, 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 557 (1974).
85. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02 (Page 1981). In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court
recently abrogated the venerable rule of sovereign immunity. See Haverlack v. Portage Homes,
Inc., 2 Ohio St. 3d 26, 442 N.E.2d 749 (1982) (opening Ohio courts to tort suits against state and
local agencies and officials).
86. Schorle v. City of Greenhills, 524 F. Supp. 821, 825 (S.D. Ohio 1981), sets out possible
substantive differences between a typical tort action under Ohio law and a § 1983 action. However, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized that § 1983 liability must be formulated
against the general background, historical or otherwise, of common-law torts. See Smith v. Wade,
103 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 n.2 (1983); Briscoe v. Lahue, 103 S. Ct. 1108, 1113 (1983); Monroe v.
Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961); see also Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 495, 501 n.84. This suggests
that the chasm between § 1983 actions and typical common-law torts, covering similar types of
official conduct, may not be as wide as the Schorle court indicated.
87. Procedures under Title VII and the OCRC are compared and contrasted in IA FED.
REG. OF EMPL. SERV. 342-54 (1983 ed.). However, the Ohio Supreme Court has held that actions
brought in court under OHIo REV. CODE ANN..ch. 4112 (Page 1980 & Supp. 1982), will be
governed by the substantive liability guidelines for Title Vii actions developed in federal court.
See Barker v. Scovill, Inc., 6 Ohio St. 3d 146, 451 N.E.2d 807 (1983); Plumbers & Steamfitters
Comm. v, Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n, 66 Ohio St. 2d 192, 421 N.E.2d 128 (1981). Most state
courts have followed this course in actions brought under their own civil rights laws. See Jackson,
Matheson & Piskorski, supra note 43, at 1515-16. Ohio's use of Title VII guidelines in such cases
provides a potent example of an "analogous" action to a Title VII suit brought in federal court.
88. No. 78-5889 (Ct. App. Montgomery Co., Ohio Jan. 12, 1979).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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actions.
In raising the issue of federally imposed obligations, the courts did
suggest some puzzling concerns. Indeed, the Supreme Court in Martinez expressly reserved this issue in the context of a section 1983 action. 9 The difficulty or confusion stems in part from the language in
Testa v. Katt.9 0 Justice Black, writing for the Court, set out the principle that state courts could not refuse to adjudicate federal actions when
they enforced similar claims arising under state law.9 1 Earlier in the
opinion, however, the Court spoke in terms of a broader principle of
federal supremacy, apparently condemning the right of a state court to
deny enforcement of claims growing out of a valid federal law.92 Similar ambiguity is apparent in the FERC decision. There the Court upheld a provision of PURPA93 mandating that state agencies consider
certain standards in fixing utility rates.9 4 While the Court had earlier
invoked the antidiscrimination principle, 5 the Court also characterized
Testa as permitting the federal government "some power to enlist a
branch of state government-there the judiciary-to further federal
ends." '96 The latter language seems to eschew any reliance on the need
to find an analogous claim which can be raised in state agencies (or
courts) under state law. This reading of Testa and FERC apparently
compels the conclusion that state courts must enforce certain federal
actions, given the mandate of the supremacy clause.
While not fully explicated in the case law, such a result is consistent with the intent of the framers of article III of the Constitution.
The framers at the Constitutional Convention of 1789 agreed that
there should be one federal Supreme Court, but debated the necessity
of creating lower federal courts.97 The debate culminated in the
"Madisonian Compromise," which permitted but did not obligate Congress to create lower federal courts.9 8 Critical to this resolution was the

See supra text accompanying note 57.
330 U.S. 386 (1947).
Id. at 389, 391, 394.
Id. at 391. See generally C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 270-71; 16 C. WRIGHT, A.
MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4024, at 718
(1977); Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 350-52.
93. Titles I and III of PURPA. 16 U.S.C. §§ 2621-24 (Supp. V 1981).
94. 456 U.S. at 771.
95. See supra text accompanying notes 78-79.
96. 456 U.S. at 762 (footnote omitted). See also id. at 762 n.27, 769 (also invoking the
"obligation" language of-Testa).
97. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 492 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
98. This is reflected in the language of U.S. CoNsT., art. III, § 1, which provides in part
that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." See generally
note 2, at _;
Redish & Woods, supra note 28, at 52-53.
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assumption that state courts would always entertain federal actions,

subject to ultimate review by the United States Supreme Court. 99 This
assumption would seem equally true today, particularly given the many

federal issues already litigated in state courts on a daily basis. Indeed,
the recent attempts by Congress to strip federal courts of jurisdiction
over actions dealing with controversial "social" issues '00 underscores
the wisdom of following the framers' intent. In short, once the ability
of state courts to adjudicate federal causes of action is established, the
history and structure of our federal system suggests that state courts
are under an obligation to leave their courts open to such actions. 10 1
Yet even this broad principle is subject to qualification. In Testa,
the Court intimated that state courts could refuse to adjudicate federal
actions where a "valid excuse" existed. 102 This formulation was apparently intended to exempt state courts of limited jurisdiction from any
obligation to entertain federal actions. 1 8 However, an examination of
the fundamental sovereignty of the states in the federal system gives
content to the "valid excuse" doctrine.10 A "valid excuse" might ar-

99. See Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 n.4 (1981); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493 n.35 (1976).
100. The court-stripping bills in the 97th Congress, none of which were enacted, are critically examined in Sager, Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981). Most writers consider Congress'
power to regulate the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court much narrower than its authority to alter
lower federal court jurisdiction. Id. at 30-36, 37-60; see also Redish, Congressional Power to
Regulate Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Under the Exceptions Clause: An Internal and
External Examination, 27 VILL. L. REv. 900 (1982).
101. See Neuborne, supra note 56, at 759-66; Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 347.
State judges should view such an obligation as an opportunity not as a burden. See supra text
accompanying notes 65-68.
102. 330 U.S. at 392. Interestingly, none of the opinions in FERC mentioned this doctrine.
103. See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 349-52. The Testa Court indicated that it did
not insist that adjudication of a federal action be taken in Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945),
which involved an Illinois court of limited jurisdiction. See also FERC, 456 U.S. at 773-74 n.4
(Powell, J., concurring and dissenting).
104. As Professor Redish has suggested, one could look to the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the tenth amendment in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
See Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 343-45 for suitable criteria. As developed by the Court, a
federal statute may be invalid under the tenth amendment if it regulates "States as States," addresses "matters that are indisputably attributes of state sovereignty," and impairs the states'
"ability to structure integral operations in areas of traditional functions." Usery, 426 U.S. at
845,
852, 854; see also EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 (1983); Hodel v. Virginia Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981). Even if the three-part test is met, the
federal interest involved may still outweigh the state interests, so as not to invalidate the statute.
FERC, 456 U.S. at 764 n.28; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 288.
Technically, the tenth amendment limitation only applies to acts of Congress done pursuant
to the commerce power. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. at 1064 n.18; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer,
427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976). Thus, it would apply to Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2 0 0 0e-l(g) (1976),
but not to § 1983, passed pursuant to the fourteenth amendment. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267, 291 (1977). Even if not directly applicable, the tenth amendment limitations are relevant to
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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guably exist when a state, while entertaining federal actions, is faced

with a burgeoning caseload or the necessity of creating additional
courts.
This parade of horribles' 0 5 clearly does not reflect the result of

sending a typical federal civil rights action through a state court. The
administrative burden involved in civil rights actions in federal courts
has been overstated. 10 It seems quite unlikely that similar burdens, to

the extent that they exist, would affect similarly situated state courts.
For reasons of convenience and familiarity alone, far fewer plaintiffs
would seek the state forum in a typical case. These few cases could
hardly be characterized as a "burden.

' 10 7

Moreover, even if an individ-

ual federal action or series of actions unduly burden a state court, the
valid excuse doctrine remains a last resort. Only the most serious circumstances merit a state court's avoidance of its obligation to enforce
federal causes of action, however.
III.

CROSS-FORUM APPLICABILITY OF SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL RULES

Having established that state courts can and should entertain fed-

eral causes of action, there remains the question of which federal substantive and procedural rules the state tribunal must apply in order to
properly adjudicate that action. Indisputably, the state court must utilize the "substantive" rules found in the applicable federal statute or

federal case law-that is, standards concerning the liability of the defendants involved. 108 This result flows from the application of the

explicating the "valid excuse" doctrine.
105. Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 358-59.
106. The large number of civil rights cases is discussed at supra notes 10- 11. Such litigation
has become increasingly complex in recent years, especially with regard to class actions, discovery,
and supervision of relief. See, e.g., Chayes, Public Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96
HARv. L. REV. 4 (1982); Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281 (1976); Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional
Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980)* In extreme cases, such factors may justify invocation of
the "valid excuse" doctrine by state courts. Redish & Muench, supra note 2, at 358 n.200.
Yet Professor Eisenberg has demonstrated, in his statistical study of the Central District of
California, that few civil rights cases will be unduly complex or burdensome. Most such cases, he
found, do not place unbearable burdens on courts, and are often dismissed at an early stage.
Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 524-56. In any event, complex, "institutional" litigation is not totally
foreign to state courts. Wolcher, supra note 69, at 193 n.14 (citing examples).
107. A recent study by the National Center for State courts found that Ohio courts have
had a slower rate of growth for civil cases than the national average. Stewart, Bucking Trend:
National Growth in Court Filings Unmatched in Ohio, Dayton Daily News, Mar. 6, 1983, at 3,
col. 2. Therefore, having some federal civil rights cases tried in Ohio courts would not be unduly
burdensome, and might help alleviate the large caseloads in Ohio federal courts. See supra note
11.
accompanying note 30.
supra text 1983
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supremacy clause." 9 A more difficult question for the state court to
address is which, if any, "procedural" rules it must adopt from the
federal forum, assuming a conflict exists between a state and a federal
rule. Such "procedural" rules typically govern the conduct of the lawsuit, including defenses, immunities, statutes of limitation, burdens of
proof, discovery, and the scope of relief available."'
Federal courts have of course struggled with similar issues in the
wake of Erie Railroad'Co.v. Tompkins,"' which mandated that federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction" apply the substantive law
of the state. The long-evolved interpretation of Erie" 3 appears to be
that state substantive law will apply, but that a Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure, if in conflict with a relevant state rule, will apply if "procedural," as that term is used in the Rules Enabling Act.11 4 Any other

109. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
I 10. For a lengthier catalog of examples, see Neuborne, supra note 56, at 767 n.173. The
problem, of course, is to distinguish "substantive" from "procedural" rules. Those terms are
crusted with so many intellectual barnacles from the Erie doctrine, discussed below, that Professor
Neuborne has suggested that the more neutral term, "collateral rules," be utilized. Id.
111. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie overruled Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), which
had interpreted the Rules of Decision Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976)), which required federal courts in diversity cases to follow only state
statutes, not state case law. In the absence of a statute, federal courts could develop and apply
their own "common law." Under Erie, state case law must be applied in such cases as well.
There is considerable controversy whether Erie was simply a reinterpretation of the Rules of
Decision Act, or also rested on constitutional underpinnings. See 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4505 (1982); Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 702-04 (1974); Neuborne, supra note 56, at 769 n.184; Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring). This inquiry has some relevance to
this article: that is, how the Constitution might mandate the application of federal procedural
rules in state courts adjudicating federal causes of action. See infra note 116.
112. The federal district courts are vested with diversity jurisdiction under. U.S. CoNsT.,
art. III, § 2, cl. I and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
113. Since 1938, three leading Supreme Court decisions have attempted to explain the
meaning of Erie. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Court appeared to
require the application of state law whenever application of federal law would be "outcome determinative," that is, lead to a different result in the lawsuit. In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the Court appeared to require that the state's interests in applying a
rule be "balanced" against the federal interests in applying a federal rule. Finally, in Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Court indicated that application of a federal or state rule would
depend on the requirements of the United States Constitution, and the standards of either the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), or the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1976). The Court's most recent pronouncement, Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740
(1980), broke no new ground and appeared to be a cautious affirmance of Hanna. See generally
19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 111, at § 4504.
114. The Enabling Act provides in part:
The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure of the district courts
and courts of appeal of the United States in civil actions .

abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right ....
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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procedure or rule, formulated by the sitting federal judge or developed
in federal case law, can be used in a diversity case under the Rules of
Decision Act, 115 so long as application of the federal rule will not likely
affect the outcome of the case. Federal rules which are outcome-determinative are held inapplicable because they are thought to increase the
dangers of forum-shopping.1 16 However, such elegant formulations can
often mask problems in differentiating "substantive" and "procedural"
state or federal rules.
Similar, though not identical, difficulties are found in what have
been described as "converse-Erie"' 7 situations, such as those discussed
in this article. "Converse-Erie" situations present the question of which
forum's procedural rules should be applied when a federal cause of action is litigated in a state court. The Supreme Court's addressing of
these issues predates Erie, with virtually all of the relevant cases involving FELA actions brought in state courts." 8 The leading cases ap-

pear to require that state procedural rules, which might substantially
hinder or defeat the plaintiff's ability to recover, be rejected in favor of
more liberal federal rules." 9 The interests of federal statutory policies
115. The Rules of Decision Act provides that "[t]he laws of the several states ... shall be
regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they
apply." 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976).
116. The tests represent the generally accepted academic interpretation of Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See, e.g., 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note
111, at § 4504; Ely, supra note 111; Redish & Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In
Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV. L. REV. 356 (1977).
A more eclectic approach, rejecting much of the above analysis and positing that Professor
Ely and others have misread the applicable statutes and case law, is found in Westen & Lehman,
Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980). Generally,
the authors argue that, in federal courts, any "valid" and "pertinent" federal rule should be applied under the supremacy clause. Id. at 314. Professor Westen's approach has been sharply criticized. See Redish, Continuing the Erie Debate: A Response to Westen and Lehman, 78 MICH. L.
REv. 959 (1980). However, Westen applied his analysis to problems of concurrent jurisdiction
that are relevant to this article, which Professor Redish did not attack. See Westen, After "Life
for Erie"--A Reply, 78 MICH. L. REV. 971, 976 (1980).
117. As coined by Hill, Substance and ProcedureIn State FELA Actions-The Converse of
the Erie Problem?, 17 OHIo ST. L.J. 384 (1956).
118. Overviews of these cases can be found in Neuborne, supra note 56, at 770-75; Hill,
supra note 117, at 387-88.
119. The leading cases are Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294 (1949) and Dice v.
Akron, C. & Y. R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). In Brown, the Court held that a state court could
not apply a rule that allegations in a complaint must be construed againstthe pleader, since strict
"local rules of pleading cannot be used to impose unnecessary burdens upon rights of recovery
authorized by federal laws." 338 U.S. at 298. In Dice, the Court held that a state court must
forego local practices and submit the question of the validity of a release to the jury. The Court
felt that a jury trial was "too substantial a part of the rights accorded" by the FELA to be denied
by a "mere 'local rule of procedure.'" 342 U.S. at 363. However, the Court suggested that the
result might be different had the state chosen to do away entirely with jury trials in negligence
cases. Id. (distinguishing Minpeapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916)). Thus,
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seem to be of major importance in these decisions.12 0
This latter line of decisions is most relevant to this article. But
some have argued that the Erie doctrine's delineation of "substance"
and "procedure" can inform the choice-of-rule decision in converseErie cases.1 2 1 Others have suggested that Erie concerns, such as the
prevention of forum-shopping,1 22 have little relevance to the adjudication of federal actions in state courts. 2 Those authorities which find

juries, might overcome federal policies derived from the statute. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,
E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, supra note 92, § 4023 at 708; C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 272.
Taken together, Brown, Dice, and related cases support the "substantial hindrance or burden" test
set out in the text. See Neuborne, supra note 56, at 779-80; Note, Procedural Protectionfor
Federal Rights in State Courts, 30 U. CIN. L. REV. 184, 185-87 (1961) [hereinafter cited as
Note, ProceduralProtection]; Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1551, 1561-64 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Note, State Enforcement]. See also The Supreme Court. 1981 Term, 96 HARV. L. REV. 186, 194-95 (1982) (asserting that the FERC decision, discussed supra note 94, implicitly reaffirms the Brown and Dice holdings, leaving virtually
no exceptions).
Most recently, in Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 (1980), the Court held that a
state court must admit evidence of the effect on income taxes of a FELA plaintiff's estimated
future earnings, and, upon request, instruct the jury that the damage award was not subject to
federal income taxes. The majority curtly assumed that such issues were "federal in character."
Id. at 493. In dissent, Justice Blackmun briefly discussed Brown and Dice and concluded "that
state rules that interfere with federal policy are to be rejected, even if they might be characterized
as 'procedural.'" Id. at 504 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
120. Brown, Dice, and related cases were predicated, in large part, on the Supreme Court's
recognition that Congress, through the FELA, sought to ameliorate the obstacles certain potential
plaintiffs faced in tort suits under state law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 1, at 568-69;
Hill, supra note 117, at 397. Yet there seems no logical reason to limit the import of those decisions to FELA cases. C. WRIGHT, supra note 1, at 270; Note, The Securities Exchange Act and
the Rule of Exclusive FederalJurisdiction,89 YALE L.J. 95, 116 nn.84-85 (1979). Such a conclusion seems particularly appropriate when considering the adjudication of a § 1983 action in
state court; Congress specifically enacted § 1983 to enable persons to protect their federal constitutional and statutory rights. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
121. Brown v. Western Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 300-02 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Note, State Enforcement, supra note 119, at 1560-62. Cf. HART & WECHSLER, supra note
1, at 571-72. Professor Hill also found that Erie applied, given his understanding that the Erie
doctrine was governed by the "outcome-determinative" test. Hill, supra note 117, at 387, 414. See
supra note 113. He might have come to a different conclusion had he been appreciative of the
current understanding of the Erie "tests." See supra notes 113, .116.
122. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 747 (1980) (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 468 (1965)). See also Redish & Phillips, supra note 116, at 378-84.
123. Note, ProceduralProtection,supra note 119, at 192.
The difference between Erie and "converse-Erie" analysis is underscored by recognizing that,
in the latter situations, the supremacy clause is the ultimate authority for controlling procedural
rules in state courts. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980); Note, ProceduralProtection,
supra note 119, at 190.
Professor Westen reached this conclusion, in analyzing the question of concurrent jurisdiction, using the example of a § 1983 action brought in state court. He felt that in such actions,
"the statute vesting concurrent jurisdiction in state courts contains an implicit policy against the
adoption of judge-made rules of procedure that are so outcome-determinative that they would
effectively prevent civil rights suits from being heard in state court." Westen & Lehman, supra
note 116, at 383.
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Erie to be an interesting but inapplicable analogue appear to have the
better of the argument. In diversity cases, no substantive federal law is
applied; in converse-Erie cases, substantive law derived from a federal
statute is applied. The existence of federal substantive interests, derived
from the statute upon which liability is predicated, argues for a strict
cabining of state procedural rules. Moreover, the rather complicated
nature of modern Erie analysis has little practical applicability to a
straightforward conflict between state rules and federal rules in state
court. When a direct conflict exists, the relevant federal rule or procedure should be followed if the state rule or procedure would substantially burden a plaintiff's chance of recovery under a federal statutory
claim. Absent such circumstances, the state court adjudicating a federal cause of action can utilize ordinary state procedural rules." 4
This test, like the Erie tests, glosses over potentially difficult questions, such as defining a "substantial burden" to a plaintiff. Fortunately, the potential conflicts between federal and state rules of procedure are diminishing. Ohio, for example, in promulgating its Rules of
Civil Procedure and Rules of Evidence,"'5 has largely replicated the
federal counterparts. Issues which are not governed by these rules
(such as the application of a statute of limitations or the calculation of
damages) should be decided only after an initial look to the federal
statute or case law for guidance. In some instances, such as with Title
VII, most if not all of the answers will be found in the statute itself.12 6
In other instances, such as with section 1983, the statute will not provide answers. In such cases, the state court can then look to state law,
as a federal court would in adjudicating a section 1983 action.1 2 7 In

124. Even if the state rule might "substantially burden" the plaintiff, the state court could
arguably still apply the rule if it applied to all lawsuits in court. See supra note 119. See also
supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text (discussing "valid excuse" doctrine).
125. On the former, see Harper, Introduction, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure: A Symposium, 39 U. CIN. L. REv. 465 (1970). On the latter, see I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE T-2 (Supp. 1982); Blakey, A Short Introduction to the Ohio Rules of Evidence, 10 CAP. U.L. REV. 237 (1980).
126. Various pre-court suit filing requirements and the availability of remedies are set out
in Title VII. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b), (f)(procedures), (g)(remedies), (k)(attorney's fees) (1976
& Supp. V 1981).
127. A state court's search for the appropriate "federal" procedural rule in a § 1983 action
should be particularly manageable. Federal courts apply a companion provision to § 1983, 42
U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), which permits courts to look to state law to fill gaps in federal law, as long
as the former is not "inconsistent" with policies of the latter. See, e.g., Board of Regents v.
Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980). See generally Eisenberg, State Law in Federal Civil Rights
Cases: The Proper Scope of Section 1988, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 499 (1980). Cognizant of the
language in § 1988, a state court in such cases can usually refer to state law.
Section 1988 also contains a provision allowing the awarding of attorney's fees to the "prevailing party." The Supreme Court has held that this provision should be applied by a state court
in a § 1983 action. Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 11 (1980). For a listing of state decisions
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short, the convergence of federal and state procedures, as well as an
initial resort to federal practice, should considerably diminish any
chance of potentially disruptive and confusing conflicts between federal
and state rules. This course can obviate the need for the state court to
determine if a state rule, in conflict with a federal rule, "substantially
burdens" the plaintiff in pursuing a federal cause of action.12
IV.

CONCLUSION

The fear of saddling Ohio courts with the adjudication of federal
civil rights actions may have implicitly motivated the decisions in Fox
v. Eaton Corp.12 ' and Wheeler v. General Motors Corp.lso Such a fear
may stem from a presumption that state judges would be unfamiliar
with federal law or burdened with increased caseloads. In so deciding,
however, these courts failed to address some rather settled doctrines-the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction, the antidiscrimination principle, and the ultimate obligation of state courts to adjudicate
such actions. These doctrinal deficiencies render the Fox and Wheeler
decisions and their progeny doubtful as precedent. 1

applying § 1988, see id. at 10-11 n.l1.
128. A discussion of the applicability of various federal or state procedural rules in § 1983
actions is presented in Neuborne, supra note 56, at 780-86.
129. 48 Ohio St. 2d 236, 358 N.E.2d 536 (1976).
130. No. 79-5889 (Ct. App. Montgomery Co., Ohio Jan. 12, 1979).
131. The significance of the apparent disagreement among Ohio decisions as to whether
federal civil rights actions can be brought in Ohio courts is underscored by a case to be decided in
the October 1983 term of the United States Supreme Court. In Migra v. Warren City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., Nos. 79-CV-271, 571 (C.P. Ct. Trumbull County, Ohio 1979), a discharged
schoolteacher sued her school board in an Ohio trial court for breach of contract and tortious
interference with contract. After holding for the plaintiff on the contract claim, the Ohio judge
dismissed, without prejudice, the remaining tort action. Plaintiff thereafter filed suit in the Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 & 1985, charging
violations of her first, fifth, and fourteenth amendment rights. In an unreported decision, the district judge dismissed the action on res judicata grounds, holding that plaintiff could have raised
the civil rights claims in the state contract action. No. C80-1183-y (N.D. Ohio Feb. 17, 1981).
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 703 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1982) (mem.). The
Supreme Court has granted certiorari. 103 S. Ct. 722 (1983) (No. 82-738). On appeal, plaintiff
argues that res judicata should not apply because her federal claims sound in tort (severed from
the contract claim in state court) and, alternatively, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 &
1985 should not be construed to permit full preclusion of her federal claims. See generally Brief
for the American Civil Liberties Union and the Greater Cleveland Chapter of the ACLU as
Amici Curiae, Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 722
(1983) (No. 82-738).
While not directly on point, this article has some relevance to both issues raised in Migra. To
the extent that there is confusion whether § 1983 actions can be brought in Ohio courts, the res
judicata effect of Ms. Migra's state court judgment should be construed narrowly. See Haring v.
Prosise, 103 S. Ct. 2368, 2373 n.7 (1983); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163 (1979).
On the other hand, to the extent that most Ohio courts have explicitly or implicitly accepted
jurisdiction of § 1983 cases, see supra text accompanying notes 56-60, Ms. Migra's efforts to
relitigate claims in federal court (assuming that to be a proper characterization of her federal
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol9/iss1/3
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Even the policy speculations that may have underlain these decisions are unfounded. Most potential plaintiffs will likely continue to
seek out the more familiar forum of the federal court. Any increase in
state court caseloads should be miniscule. More importantly, the
courts' refusal to open their doors to such actions only lends credence
to the self-fulfilling prophecy, often repeated by academics, that state
courts are institutionally unable or philosophically unwilling to properly
adjudicate and protect federal rights. Such criticisms may have been
valid a century ago; they certainly should not be fostered in this century-much less by state courts themselves. As partners with the national courts in a federal system, the time is at hand for Ohio courts to
fully accept the presumption of concurrent jurisdiction over federal
civil rights actions.

lawsuit) should be viewed less charitably. The latter result is suggested by the spirit and holding
of Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes
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